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Introduction 
In his classic work on the interpretation of the English existential construction, 
Gary Milsark ( 1 974) proposed a two-way distinction in interpretations of 
determiner phrases, a two way classification of one-place predicates, and a 
generalization about their ability to combine. 
Milsark proposed that DPs can be given a 'cardinality' interpretation or a 
true 'quantificational '  interpretation. The distinction between the two types of 
interpretation, or construal, trifurcates the syntactic category DP into those DPs 
which are unambiguously quantificational, unambiguously cardinal, or ambiguous 
between the two construals. The distinction between the two construals is 
illustrated by a subtle ambiguity in ( 1 -2): 
1 .  Some unicorns entered the garden. 
2. Many people were at the party. 
He says that "both these examples show an ambiguity in the interpretation of their 
subject NP. Thus ( 1 )  can mean either than an indefinite number of unicorns 
entered or that some of the unicorns entered, but others, presumably, remained 
outside. Similarly, (2) can mean either that the party had rather a lot of people at 
it or that it is  true of many people, as opposed, one suspects, to others, that they 
were at the party."  [ 1 974 : 1 99] The three-way classification of DPs is 
exemplified in (3) : 
3. Weak Construal 
a dog, sm men 
this guy (nondemonstrative) 
<:--------
three, etc. 
several, many 
bare plurals 
Strong Construal 
------> 
the, this/that 
neither, both 
every, each, all 
nwst 
The distinction in one-place predicates divides them into those which express 
'state descriptions' and those which express 'properties' . The chart in (4) is part 
of the extension of this classification: 
4. State Descriptions 
sick, drunk, open 
Properties 
tall, intelligent, a lawyer 
The constraint on their combination is illustrated in the pattern in (5). 
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S.a The man is sick 
. b The man is tall 
.c Sm men are sick 
.d *Sm men are tall 
(Strong + State Description) 
(Strong + Property) 
(Weak + State Description) 
(Weak + Property) 
Milsark's Generalization concerns the explanation of (Sd) : 
6. Milsark's Generalization: Properties may only be predicated of Strong 
NPs. (= Individual level predicates must have strong subjects.) 
The terminology which has become standard since Carlson ( 1 977) for the 
distinction among predicates is, of course, stage-level predicate and individual­
level predicate for 'state-descriptive' and 'property' respectively. The reanalysis 
of the strong and weak distinction as a division in types of generalized quantifiers 
was enshrined by Barwise and Cooper ( 1980). 
This much is ancient history. The questions of interest have been: 
7.a How can we give a defmition of the individual/stage level distinction? 
.b What is the distinction between weak and strong construals? 
.c Why should Milsark's generalization be true? 
To these three questions, I want to add two more: 
.d Why are some DPs necessarily weak? 
.e Which is the interesting case, (Sc) or (Sd)? 
That is, is it more interesting that weak readings are possible with stage-level 
predicates, or that strong readings are necessary with individual-level predicates? 
These questions are taken up by Kratzer ( 1989) and Diesing ( 1 992). Kratzer 
proposed to define stage-level predicates as those whose meanings contain a 
bindable spatio-temporal or event variable. From this characterization, a number 
of traditional tests for the distinction can be interpreted as owing to the success or 
failure to bind that variable. Diesing builds upon this definition with a series of 
assumptions from which Milsark's generalization is supposed to follow. As I 
understand the proposal, its derivation is as in (8): 
8. Diesing's Derivation of Milsark's Generalization 
a. Weak readings of indefinites are the result of existential closure; strong 
readings involve quantificational operators. 
b. VP is the domain of existential closure. 
c. The 'subject' role of a predicate is projected VP internally. 
d. Individual-level predicates only occur under 'transitive' !NFL; stage-level 
predicates (can) occur under 'unaccusative' !NFL. 
e. Subjects of raising predicates optionally reconstruct; subjects of control 
predicates cannot reconstruct. 
f. Therefore subjects of Individual-level predicates are subjects of a control 
predicate (the transitive !NFL). 
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g. Therefore Subjects of ILPs cannot reconstruct. 
h. Therefore Subjects of ILPs cannot be given weak: construals. 
The last point is presumably equivalent to Milsark's generalization. 
Kuroda's Hypothesis 
In a series of papers beginning with ( 1972) and most recently ( 1992), Yuki 
Kuroda has defended the relevance of a distinction in 'judgment forms' which 
goes back to the philosophy of Franz Brentano ( 1 874, 1924) and its application in 
grammatical theory by his student Anton Marty. To quote Kuroda (1972: 154): 
''This theory assumes, unlike either traditional or modem logic, that there 
are two different fundamental types of judgments, the categorical and the 
thetic. Of these, only the former conforms to the traditional paradigm of 
subject-predicate, while the latter represents simply the recognition or 
rejection of material of a judgment. Moreover, the categorical judgment is 
assumed to consist of two separate acts, one the act of recognition of that 
which is to be made the subject, and the other, the act of affirming or 
denying what is expressed by the predicate about the subject. With this 
analysis in mind, the thetic and the categorical judgments are also called 
the simple and the double judgments (Einfache Urteil and Doppelurteil). 
The most important part of this view for our immediate purpose is that there are 
two different judgment forms, one of which has a "presupposed" subject in the 
sense that a precondition for making the judgment is that 'the mind of the judger 
must be directed ftrst to an individual, before the predicate can be connected to it' . 
Kuroda' s most compelling argument for the relevance of this distinction 
comes from his analysis of Japanese topicalizing wa as a marker of the logical 
Subject of a categorical judgment. The analysis can be illustrated by considering 
the translation of 'the cat is sleeping there' into Japanese as either (9) or ( 10), 
which differ only in the postposition on the (determinerless) NP neko. 
9. neko ga asoko de nemutte iru 
the/a cat there sleeping is 
10. neko wa asoko de nemutte iru 
the cat there sleeping is 
(Thetic) 
(Categorical) 
These two sentences reflect the difference in judgment type. (9) expresses a thetic 
judgment; it would be used to report perception of a situation in which althe cat is 
sleeping in a certain place. It simply afftrms the existence of an eventuality of a 
certain type. ( 1 0) might be used to describe the same situation, but in an 
essentially different way. As a categorical judgment it draws attention ftrst to the 
cat, and then says of the cat that it is sleeping there. Correlated with this 
difference is the fact that in ( 10), the bare noun marked by wa cannot be taken as a 
nonspeciftc indeftnite cat; it must be a particular cat. This follows from the 
presuppositional nature of the subject of a categorical judgment; the cat must be 
presented qua individual before the property of sleeping there can be attributed to 
it. 
It is a short step from this discussion to see a parallel between the elimination of 
the possibility of the nonspecific construal of neko in ( 10) and the anomaly in 
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(5d), and to see the subtle ambiguity in ( 1 -2) as reflecting the same kind of 
difference between judgment forms. 
It raises the question of whether there is a derivation of Milsark' s generalization 
directly from the assumptions involved in the ontology underyling the thetic 
categorical distinction. It is the goal of this paper to explore such a derivation. 
Consider how it would go: 
1 1 . Derivation of Milsark' s Generalization (First version) 
a. ILPs must be predicates in Categorical Judgments. 
b. The subject of a categorical judgment cannot be a nonspecific 
indefinite, its reference is "presupposed". 
c. Strong construals are the result of this "presupposition". 
d. Therefore, the subject of an ILP must have a strong construal. 
( l I d) is Milsark 's  generalization. So to the extent to which ( l Ia-c) can be 
justified in terms of this type of ontology, there is a derivation of the interaction 
between strong construals and individual-level predicates. 
More Brentano 
Brentano saw his task as giving a classification of cognitive acts. He categorized 
such 'thoughts'  into three main groups: presentations, judgments, and love. By 
this unexpected latter term, he  meant affectual attitudes. 
The notion of 'presentation' in his system is both fundamental and difficult to 
grasp. Its essence is the idea that a cognitive agent can have a presentation of an 
object without it being the presentation of any particular object. One can entertain 
presentations of objects which do not nor could not have any real existence, like 
unicorns, golden mountains, and I suppose round squares. Achieving a 
presentation of something is the first step toward the other two types of acts, of 
which judgments concern us most. 
Judgments (and affectual attitudes or reactions) come in contrary pairs of 
affirmation and denial, the two modes of judgment. The basis for a judgment is a 
simple or compound presentation, so the root of the thetic/categorical distinction 
is in the definition of possible bases for judgments. 
The basis for a thetic judgment is a presentation of an object: an entity or 
eventuality. An affirmation of such a presentation commits the judger to the 
existence of something which satisfies the presentation; a denial by contrast 
expresses a negative existence judgment. 
The basis for a categorical judgment is compound: first a presentation which is 
clarified into a particular object satisfying the description, and then a property to 
be affirmed or denied of the object. 
Despite the conceptualist foundation of this system, I think we can model it with 
some familiar objects. Let us equate the notion of a presentation of an object for a 
description of an object. A description is something which can be satisfied by an 
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object. Take object to range over both individuals and eventualities, and we have 
two sorts of descriptions: descriptions of an individual and descriptions of an 
eventuality. Properties we can take as basic, but crucially not as descriptions of 
an individual or an eventuality. The modified ontology then is summarized in 
( 12): 
12. Modified Brentanan Ontology 
objects: individuals, eventualities 
descriptions of individuals and descriptions of eventualities 
properties 
The assumptions about the forms of judgment can be summarized in ( 13) :  
13. Judgment structure 
a. Basis for a thetic judgment: a description 
b. Basis for a categorical judgment: an object and a property. 
c. A thetic judgment is an affirmation or denial of the description in the 
basis. (Existential commitment) 
d. A categorical judgment is an affirmation or denial of the basis property 
to the object in the basis. (Predication) 
Note that ( 13c) and ( 13d) contain a theory of negation which recognizes both a 
relational and a unary notion of negative mode of judgment. The utility of this 
distinction has been argued for eloquently in precisely the same tradition by Hom 
1989, which put me onto this line of thinking. 
We are almost ready to revisit the derivation of Milsark' s generalization. 
What is missing suggests another borrowing from Brentano. If (9) and one 
reading of (1 -2) are thetic judgments, they contain a single description in their 
basis. What is that description? It is the description of an eventuality of a cat 
sleeping there or unicorns entering a garden or a group of people being at a party. 
But that description is itself a composition of a parameterized eventuality 
description with various individual descriptions. 
Hence we must assume that the theory of argument saturation can work on 
two levels, either by restricting a parameter in an eventuality description with 
another description or specifying an object as the value of the parameter. 
In Brentano's view of the existential commitment of a thetic judgment, 
only one description is affirmed. In (9), only the existence of the eventuality is 
affirmed, but commitment to that description will indirectly, obliquely in his 
translator's  terms, commit the judger to the existence of the cat. But the cat has a 
much fuzzier existence in the thetic judgment than it does in the categorical 
version, where it is presented and affirmed directly, first of all, before moving on 
to the predication. In this way, Brentano's  view of the thetic mode of j udgment 
nicely represents the effects of unselective existential closure over the description, 
giving priority to one object, while obliquely entailing the existence of subparts of 
the complex object 
These assumptions also call our attention to the weak and strong 
distinction again, suggesting that the essence of a weak construal is interpretation 
as a description. Descriptions cannot combine with nondescriptions. So if weak 
construals are descriptions, then the impossibility of combining them directly with 
properties follows. 
But this view fractures Milsark' s, and Barwise and Cooper' s, cut of weak 
vs strong. Though the definite descriptions are in their terms strong, they must, 
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however, on the view given here count as descriptions of objects which can 
specify the parameters of complex descriptions. So these strongly construed 
phrases are not banned from inclusion in the basis of a thetic judgment. The 
quantificational ones are another matter, and we will turn to them shortly. 
But first let us return to the attempt to derive Milsark' s generalization 
from this analysis: 
1 1 . Derivation of Milsark' s Generalization (Second Try) 
a. Properties cannot be the basis of a thetic judgment, only part of the 
basis of a Categorical Judgment 
b. The subject of the basis of a categorical judgment must be an object, 
not a description of an object 
c. Strong construals are either object denoting or quantificational. 
d. Therefore, the subject of an ILP must have a strong construal. 
We have cleaned up the derivation a bit, but highlighted the question of how 
general propositions are to be analyzed. Before turning to this, there are some 
loose ends and connections to be acknowledged. 
Some loose ends and connections 
One loose end is, how is it possible to have a categorical judgment whose basis 
contains a description? That is, how is ( 10), with the material which can combine 
to form the basis of a thetic judgment to be factored into an individual and a 
property? I assume that it is possible to freely derive properties from a thetic 
judgment by abstraction. That the judgment form is independent of the syntactic 
notion of subject is made clear by Kuroda' s discussion of the result of wa marking 
on a non subject, as in ( 15): 
15. neko wa inu ga oikakete iru 
the cat I the/a dog is chasing 
The cat is being chased by a dog. 
He says, taking certain liberties with examples and example numbers, ( 1972: 167) 
''The judgment represented by (10) is based on the thetic judgment represented by 
(9) ; the syntactic subject inu is made the subject of that categorical judgment 
Now the syntactic subject is not the only constituent that can be made the subject 
of a categorical judgment. [ . . .  in ( 1 5)] one may have a categorical judgment 
based on [a] thetic judgment but setting [the object] neko as the subject. 
I take the idea that properties can be abstracted from thetic judgments to 
be the mechanism which allows descriptions to provide the predicate of a 
categorical judgment. The derived property is the property of being a participant 
in an eventuality of that description. 
The analysis laid out here does not contain much which is startlingly 
novel. Most, if not all, of the distinctions drawn here are part of standard situation 
semantics: the separation of polarity values out in the specification of the 
description of a state of affairs, the restriction approach to argument 'saturation' , 
and (catephorically) the importance of the spatiotemporal parameter in certain 
states of affairs. Drawing out those connections here would take me beyond the 
time and preparation for this talk. t 
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Returning to the Kratzer-Diesing derivation of Milsark's generalization, 
we can see what I have laid out here as a proposal for interpreting the abstract 
INFL structures postulated by Diesing's analysis. Taking the points in turn, the 
weak readings of indefinites are the result of oblique existential closure due to the 
thetic mode of judgment. If in the languages that she is describing the category 
VP is crucially the domain of existential closure, it means that thetic judgments 
draw their basis from material analyzed as originating in the VP. Individual level 
predicates are not descriptions (and here the role of the Kratzer definition in terms 
of the presence of an eventuality argument is clear), so they cannot be the basis of 
a thetic judgment. There is a direct analogy between the unary nature of a thetic 
basis and hence mode of judgment and the binary nature of the basis and mode of 
a categorical judgment. The possibility of derived properties means that stage­
level predicates can occur in categorical judgments (i.e. 'under transitive INFL') 
as well. Reconstruction is simply an artifact of the assumptions about the syntax­
semantics interface. But the derivation of the conclusion seems quite parallel. 
Hence the literature on the categorical and thetic judgments, and particularly 
Kuroda's work, is relevant reading for those interested in expanding her account 
or in the line of analysis of Bowers 1993. 
I have not gone into the derivation of the correlated effects in existentials, 
because I have nothing to say beyond what McNally 1992 says. She bases her 
analysis on the notion that the existential construction involves the affirmation or 
denial of a description in the pivot position and makes a case for dividing the 
Barwisian-Cooperian category of strong DPs in the way that has been forced on 
us here. 
Quantificational Readings Revisited 
So in the remaining time let I will turn to matters of extension and address first 
the analysis of quantificationally strong DPs. 
Brentano suggests that the thetic/categorical distinction ought to run 
through the domain of quantificational propositions as well. As Kuroda points 
out, the details of that analysis are motivated by other than descriptive 
considerations and his proposals should not be imported into the current situation. 
As far as I know, the binding operator analysis of generalized quantifiers or the 
higher-order relational interpretation of quantificational determiners could be 
imported into this view. What I want to do here is sketch an analysis, without 
arguing for it now, of another possibility created by the notion of 'mode of 
judgment' in this analysis. 
As described here, the algebra of the two modes of judgment is the 
simplest boolean structure: two dual values of negation and affirmation. But we 
might consider expanding this algebra further to include the modes corresponding 
to quantificational determiners. If we did this, an obvious analogy between the 
tripartite structure of quantificational operator representations and the tripartite 
(including the mode of jUdgment) nature of a categorical judgment springs to 
mind. The analogy would match the restriction of a quantificational operator with 
the subject of the categorical judgment and the nuclear scope, properly abstracted 
over the variable to be bound with the predicate of the judgment. 
Now what do we know about the subject of a categorical judgment? It is 
presupposed, in the sense that 'the mind is directed first to the object which is the 
subject, and then the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject. ' Now 
restrictions of quantificational operators are known for their presuppositional 
nature. They are presupposed to be non-empty in the usual case; the domain of 
quantification is defined first and then the elements of the domain are subjected 
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individually to the nuclear scope and checked for satisfaction. This has a pleasing 
parallel with the description of a categorical judgment and reminds us again that it 
is the direct successor to Aristotle's  categorical analysis of quantification. 
Certain determiners, particularly the proportional ones, are essentially 
relational. But not all are. The weak determiners are equivalent to predicates on 
sets. There is no necessity in treating them as essentially relational, though no 
barrier to that analysis either. 
But if we imagine generalizing the notion 'mode of judgment' here, we are 
led to ask whether there would be thetic quantificational sentences as well. How 
would they differ from categorical quantificational sentences? They would show 
none of the presuppositional effects in their restrictions that are due to the 
presuppositional nature of the subject of a categorical judgment. Can we test this 
conjecture out? 
I think we can, though I can offer only two suggestions, one 
autobiographical. I got into this state from concerns that arose in my analysis of 
negative concord within the theory of indefinites. I proposed at this conference 
two years ago an analysis in which negative concord terms were treated as 
indefinites roofed in the nuclear scope of an abstract negation operator associated 
with the head of the clause, a feature of INfL. In LF-movement based analyses of 
negative concord, such as Laka ( 1990) and Zanuttini (1991 ), a similar approach is 
taken but the assumption is that the negative concord terms move into the 
specifier of a negative operator. Identifying the specifier of a negative head with 
the restriction of a negative operator, I realized that these potentially represented 
two different approaches to negative concord, one which claimed the negative 
concord was essentially quantificational and the terms represented the restriction 
of the operator (the LF movement account) and a non-quantificational account 
(mine) in which the terms were just weakly construed descriptions in the scope of 
the abstract negative operator. 
Of course the laws of quantifier negation render the two approaches truth­
conditionally equivalent. So I had to go in search of a probe which would 
distinguish the two positions. And I found the presuppositional nature of the 
restriction of a quantificational operator. What is at issue is the semantic 
analysis of a sentence like ( 16),  even in standard English. 
16.  Nobody left 
Should this be taken as a quantificational claim, presuming that there are people 
and claiming of that set of people that none of them left? Having trained myself 
to spot the subtle difference between categorical and thetic jUdgments, however, I 
convinced myself that while it could be taken that way, it needn't. I can imagine 
perceiving a situation in which nothing much happens. In particular, no exitings 
occur. And then I could use ( 16) to describe that situation. It sounds like the way 
you describe the use of a sentence expressing a thetic judgment to me. But 
consider the sentences in ( 17)-(19). 
17 .  Most people left 
18 .  Each person left 
19. Three people left 
The determiner most is essentially relational, and so we know that ( 1 7) must 
express a categorical judgment. And indeed it seems that you cannot use ( 17) 
without presupposing a particular set of people about which you are making the 
claim that most left. ( 1 8) contains the distributive universal each and the same 
227 
228 William Ladusaw 
intuition holds. Now (19) contains a weak determiner, so it is actually ambiguous 
between a categorical and a thetic mode of predication (as well as having a 
description construal). And I think that it is possible to see it as ambiguous as 
well, between a presuppositional reading which is covertly partitive (the 
categorical construal) and the nonpresuppositional reading on which no particular 
set of people is presumed. Of course the description analysis of the weak 
determiner phrases has already provided an account of this reading as well, so 
there is no argument here for a thetic mode of judgment analysis of it. B ut I 
would have to work to prevent it. 
Finally let me note that as far as I can tell, the creation of a generalized 
conversational scalar implicature from these determiners correlates exactly with 
the presence of a categorical construal. The proportional quantifiers always give 
rise to it, as they are always covertly partitive. But on the thetic reading of ( 19)  
(with no sentence accent in the subject phrase) there is  no implicature that there 
were people who didn 't  leave. However on the categorical construal, with a 
sentence accent in the subject phrase, there is one. This is an effect I can ' t  see 
deriving from the simple truth-conditional notion of a proposition. 
Conclusion 
There are more points of extension and connection than I have time to lay out 
here. So I will conclude just by reviewing the original goal of the paper: to 
investigate the extent to which the Milsarkian effects were derivable from the 
Kurodian assumption that the thetic I categorical distinction should be imported 
directly into the semantics, rather than considered only an aspect of discourse 
information packaging, where a whole literature on the distinction exists that has 
not been reviewed here. (But cf. Sasse 1987. The principal argument for seeing 
this distinction as part of the semantic foundation is that (perhaps universally) 
certain attempts to create a proposition simply fail, and they fail in embedded 
contexts as well as root contexts.) 
I judge the attempt to have been successful to the extent that it has allowed 
us to answer the questions posed above. 
20.a Keep the distinction between !LPs and SLPs as one between properties and 
descriptions, making use of Kratzer's proposal if possible . 
. b Weak and strong construals of DPs are not the distinction that Milsark 
originally made nor that of Barwise and Cooper, but correspond to a 
description, referential expression, and quantificational mode of judgment 
contrast which is epiphenomenal on the underlying distinction between 
judgment types . 
. c Milsark's generalization is derived as above . 
. d It is possible for a language to have lexical items which are able to be 
interpreted as descriptions or referring expressions, but not modes of 
predication . 
. e They both are. 
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Notes 
*This is the SALT talk as presented. I am grateful to Donka Farkas, Ted Fernald, Yuki Kuroda, 
Louise McNally, Peter Svenonius, and particularly Barbara Scholz for discussions of these 
ideas; none of them are responsible for the result This research was supported by NFS grant 
BNS -9021398. 
tSome of these issues have been clarified for me in post-SALT conversations with Robin Cooper; 
the results of those discussions have not been incorporated here. 
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